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    The poor no longer the creators of wealth
    But an expensive nuisance
       W.H. Auden
Public Assistance to the poor in the United States was always been reluctant and especially 
cruel to women. A society that from the outset prized Kantian principles of individual 
freedom over Rousseau’s notions of social contract and that was dominated by a puritanical 
morality saw poverty as self-made. If individuals had freedom of choice, bad outcomes were 
necessarily caused by bad choices. The poor had themselves to blame. 
Poverty was a sign of deviant norms. For women this meant deviance from the ideal 
nuclear family. Women who were deserted, separated or single were treated punitively by 
public institutions and with missionary zeal by charity organizations intent on controlling 
their behavior (Abramovitz, 1989; Wagner, 2000).
The welfare state emerged only in the mid-1930s in the United States, much later than in 
most advanced industrial societies, and it is for this reason that some authors have labeled 
it the “reluctant” welfare state. It had two distinct types of programs: social insurance and 
public assistance. Until recently, the social insurance programs followed the model of private 
insurance; they are contributory.  The assistance programs followed the charity model, even if 
they were garahteed entitlements. Among the latter the most significant program for women 
in poverty was the Assistance to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Among public 
assistance programs, AFDC had the lowest budget, the most restrictive admission criteria 
and awarded the smallest benefits.
The supremacy of liberal values over social democratic tenets led to a tension-ridden 
model that Esping–Andersen (1990) dubbed the “liberal welfare state.” Dahl (1985, 1998) 
describes the regime as a compound of freedom reigning in the market, with participation 
reduced to procedural democracy. The simplification of Adam Smith ideas led inexorably 
to large social inequities, and procedural democracy was unable to control the influence 
of powerful economic interests. The upshot is that financial power necessarily conditions 
political decisions. This situation shapes a welfare state in which assistance and even 
insurance is contingent on the costs and benefits that these measures carry for private 
economic interests. The model stands in contrast with social democracies where the norm 
is for the economy to serve the general needs of the citizens (Jones, 1985).
Accordingly, policy makers handled the recession of the early 1980’s by cutting assistance 
and other programs that addressed the urgent needs of citizens in poverty. Conversely, 
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government decisions benefited the affluent. A trickle-down rationale presupposed that 
favoring entrepreneurs allowed them to invest in production and create new jobs, thus 
ultimately helping American workers. The response to the 2001 recession has been modeled 
along the same lines, although the trickle-down effect had been disproved two decades 
before.
A review of the process of exclusion during the second half of the 1990’s, when the nation 
experienced an economic boom, is particularly enlightening. Distributive injustice in times 
of economic contraction can be blamed on erroneous theories (supply-side or Keynesian), 
but hardships imposed on the most vulnerable citizens in a period of affluence require a 
more complex interpretation.
Focusing on the struggles and imprisonment of poor women highlights how public 
assistance and correctional systems have robbed them of their citizenship status and treated 
them as expendable. These institutions construct a holistic definition of such women as 
deviant, in fact attributing to them an “other” identity, which blocks sympathy on the part 
of “solid citizens.” The distance and isolation created by stigma and prison walls have the 
effect of rendering their circumstances invisible.
The marginality of women in poverty and behind bars has a long history (Abramovitz, 
1989; Pimlott & Sarri, 2002). While acknowledging the institutional path dependency from 
the past, the present discussion focuses on the last fifteen years. The analytic frame examines 
the economic restructuring and neo-conservative ideology underlying policies that affect 
poor women. The oppression of women is embedded in circumstances that oppress others 
as well. The specific mechanisms that force women towards the margins are located within 
this broader context.
Economic Restructuring and Inequality
Capitalism brings with it the expectation of inequality. Markets are built on competition. 
Some participants will win; others will lose. Streaks of winning will make future wins 
easier and result in the accumulation of capital, the engine of further growth. The utilitarian 
assumption is that, regardless of inequality, the whole will be better off (Kuttner, 1984).
Government regulations, taxation, and income transfers redress some of the inevitable 
inequality engendered by the market. The United States has never been very efficient at 
such redistribution. The onset of the welfare state was tardy, and transfers to the poor were 
restricted, residual, and meager (Handler, 2002). On the other hand, tax policy has favored 
the better off. Compared with other capitalist welfare regimes, economic inequality in the 
United Sates has been greater, but recently it has risen to levels unknown since the 1920s 
and is now far in excess of other advanced societies  (Figueira-McDonough, 2007a: chap. 3). 
The Gini index for the United States at the end of the ‘90s was .401 as compared to Germany 
and Canada, at .281 and .312 respectively (World Bank, 1999, Table 2.8). 
Worsening inequality indicates a relative decline of working class income. At the end of 
the ‘90s, 2O % of the families with the highest income received 47 % of all income, while 
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the lowest 20 % got only 4.2 %. Comparing these distributions to the 1970s shows that 
better-off has increased their share by 6.3 percent while those in the bottom three quintiles 
lost by the same proportion. Although productivity increased between these two periods the 
weekly earnings of 80 percent of rank-and-file workers fell by 18 %. At the same time the 
income of CEOs increased 19 %. (U.S.  Bureau of the Census, 1998, Table F-2).
Explanations for the emergence of a two-tiered society are usually linked to de-
industrialization, economic globalization, and technological advances. More precisely, 
the situation involves the loss of manufacturing jobs due to more efficient production 
processes. The result is massive numbers of laid off semi-skilled blue-collar workers, now 
scrambling for lower paying service jobs. Furthermore, as some low skilled jobs move 
to developing countries, where production is considerably cheaper, wages at home are 
further depressed. Conversely, the dynamics of world market competition have created a 
very well paid technologically trained service work force (Sassen, 1998). This logic of the 
inexorable demands of the market is used to supercede the moral issue of extreme inequality 
within a democratic regime (Gray, 1998, 2006). However, technological innovations, de-
industrialization, and global competition impinge not only on the economy of the United 
State. Other market economies do not reach the level of inequality characteristic of the 
United States (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Goodin et al., 1999)
 The accompanying graph shows the extreme income accumulation at the top of the 
economic ladder. After some redistribution in the ‘60s and ‘70s, the 80s income differentiation 
accelerated again in the ‘80s. If wealth is also considered, the accumulation at the top would 
be still more extreme. The richest one percent of Americans control 50 percent of net financial 
assets (Mishel et al., 2001). While theories derived from past experience have linked positive 
economic cycles with benefits to the whole population, they proved not to be valid for the boom of 
the ‘90s. Instead, the evidence shows the growth of a powerful economic oligarchy, based on crony 
capitalism, a trend that is incongruent with democratic principles (Dahl, 1998).
Income inequality graph
Comparison between the average income of the bottom 99% of the population 
and of the richest 1% in the United States: 1930-2000
x=average income of 99 percent of the population         y= average income of the richest 1 percent
source: Thomas Piketty and Emanuel Saez - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER working paper 8467)
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Neo-Conservative Ascendancy and the Fashioning of Exclusion
Kuttner (1997), Phillips (1990) and Gray (1998), among others, agree that the United 
States has veered away from the democratic equality praised by Tocqueville, the vision 
of expanding opportunities of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal in the ‘30s and of Lyndon 
Johnson’s Great Society in the 60s. They contend that governmental institutions have been 
hijacked by neo-conservative ideologies. This retrenchment gained legitimacy during the 
Reagan administration; its chief effect was condoning wide economic inequality.
A key dimension of the neo-conservative vision was the proposal for a return to a 
laissez faire regime by scaling back regulations, implementing Lockean restrictions on state 
interference in the market, and weakening the power of unions (Kuttner, 1997). The appeal 
of this ideology was buttressed by statements linking laissez faire to national economic 
successes in the nineteenth century.
Goodin and associates (1999) observe that historical evidence does not support this image 
of a hands-off role for the state in that century. Examples of early state intervention include 
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787and an arsenal of government subsidies that served as a 
framework for territorial expansion, such as the cross-national railroad. Public subsidies 
for this enterprise were at the root of the great family fortunes of post-Civil War decades, a 
period known as the age of the “robber barons.” The foundation of early American prosperity 
was also linked to large-scale federal work projects and to tariff policies. Gray (1998) goes 
further by arguing that no market economy has been so invasive of personal liberties than 
the United States during prohibition.
In spite of its misguided historical claims, neo-conservative ideology has a very clear 
program. The combination of demands for greater autonomy of the market, and a call for 
enforcing control on certain citizens on moral grounds, is trademark of the neo-conservative 
worldview.  Strong class biases are incorporated in both proposals. The remolding of the 
American society to suit the “imperatives of the market” carried with it an ethos of rugged 
individualism, liberal understandings of self-help, and puritanical notions of virtue and 
punishment.
On the one hand, public assistance was interpreted as contributing to the erosion of 
American virtues—autonomy, devotion to the work ethic, the family ethic, and the community 
ethic (Murray, 1984; Mead, 1986). On the other hand, public assistance was seen as a waste 
of resources that delayed economic growth by encumbering capital with taxation (Greenberg, 
1985). The ideology gained ground in the ‘80s and has controlled the Congress from 1994 
to the present.
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The Ambivalent Welfare State and the 1996 Reform
The United States is a prototype of the liberal model of welfare. The model presupposes 
that the road to well being for citizens can be achieved primarily through a highly productive 
economy and participatory insurance, and only very secondarily through a residual system 
of public assistance. Universal programs such as national health and universal child benefits 
are non-existent, in an economy promising high incomes. Also , within an efficient economy, 
poverty would be quite low and therefore the need for public assistance minimal.
Goodin and associates (1999) mounted a break-through study to test how the outcomes of 
this liberal model compared to other welfare states based on distinct assumptions: corporatist 
(represented by Germany) and socio-democratic (represented by the Netherlands). The project 
used ten-year panel data for the three countries during the 1985-1995 decade.
They found that the efficiency of the three economies, as measured by the gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita growth, was quite similar, but that median income growth was lower 
in the United States than in the other countries (50 % as compared to 63 % and 75 %). On the 
other hand, the amount of poverty created by the market in these three countries is equally 
high (around 20 %), but after government transfers it is considerably lower in Germany (9 
%) and Denmark (4.5 %) than in the United States (18 %). Thus, while economic efficiency 
and market outcomes do not vary across the different type of welfare states, the weakness 
of anti-poverty programs in the United States results in much higher poverty levels.
Estimating the number of people who remain poor during the ten years of the study also 
reveals a difference in long-term poverty. In the Netherlands very few stayed in poverty for 
ten years (0.5 %); Germany showed a one-third decrease (6 %). But in the United States, 
18 % remained poor for the decade studied.  The contrast is aggravated if we consider that 
50 % of the poor in the liberal system were classified as being in deep poverty (unable to 
afford basic goods) and that government intervention over the 10-year period only improved 
the situation of two percent in that group.
While the United States did in fact have higher levels of employment than the other 
two countries, data also showed that 10 % of the employed remained poor. According to a 
multi-deprivation index, created by the same researchers, five percent of households with 
working heads fell in the bottom category, and among households headed by women the 
percentage was four times higher (20 %).
It was against this background that the neo-conservative movement took hold of Congress 
and passed an agenda broadcast as the “Contract with America” in 1994. The manifesto 
covered nearly all of the causes dear to get-tough conservatives: the implementation of tax 
cuts, restrictions on public expenses, reduction of government regulations of the market 
and anti-litigation reform.  At the same time, the contract addressed moral issues such as 
a constitutional amendment banning abortion, higher earning limits for seniors on social 
security, more punitive crime legislation, and the elimination of social services in prisons. 
The section on AFDC encapsulated a litany of goals that were later incorporated in the 
1996 reform:
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denial of welfare to teenage mothers; denial of higher payments to mothers who give 
birth to children while on welfare; a strict two-years-and-out provision for public assistance 
recipients; stringent work requirements as incentives to individual responsibility; caps on 
spending for public assistance programs, public, nutrition programs for poor infants , school 
children and pregnant  mothers. 
The targets were poor female heads of households with dependent children (90 % of the 
recipients). While this program had traditionally been the least generous of all the public 
assistance measures, it had nonetheless been a federal entitlement since 1935. This meant 
that citizens in poverty had the right to be helped, and that this right was under federal 
supervision and funding, ensuring response to need. AFDC was dismantled in 1996, and 
Temporary Assistance to Needed Families (TANF) took its place.
TANF was more restrictive than AFDC. Recipients could not remain in the program 
for more than two consecutive years and never for more than five years over their life span 
regardless of need. The states had full responsibility for implementation, and received block 
grants from the federal government based on the assistance load of 1995. To receive grants, 
states were obliged to meet a targeted yearly decrease in the assistance caseload by moving 
the recipients into the labor market. Although coated in a language promoting self-sufficiency, 
many women were sanctioned if unable to get a job within a given period. The measure of 
success was the drop in the number of women receiving assistance. Other services created by 
the legislation had a strong moral thrust, for example, promoting marriage and sanctioning 
new births. Most importantly, the principle of citizen entitlement was erased.
Legislative discussions made clear that the reform was justified on myths about women 
in poverty. AFDC had offered a comfortable option for lazy women who lived on the dole, 
left their husbands, were sexually promiscuous, and kept having children to increase benefits. 
In sum, the program was a source of immoral behavior that was costly to tax payers. The 
subtext of the new legislation (TANF) was to reform poor women: they would be forced to 
work, return to the ideal nuclear family, and control their sexuality. This view prevailed in 
spite of research showing that most of these women were already poor while living with the 
father of their children, two thirds of them left AFDC within a three-year period, and had 
an average number of children below the national rate (Handler, 2002; Bane, 1986). Many 
recipients who left the assistance program prior to the reform could not bear living with the 
negative stereotypes and the bureaucratic surveillance that invaded their private life. 
TANF recipients were forced to get a job or be sanctioned. In both cases, because the 
majority was poorly educated, the jobs available offered very low salaries. By 2003 nearly 
30 % of female heads of households working full time had incomes below the poverty line. 
They joined other working women heads of households (29 %) who had incomes below 
the poverty level (Yates, 2003).
Since over 46 % of mothers covered by TANF have children under six, childcare is 
essential. The United States does not have a public child care system, but it does give a partial 
subsidy for childcare in any private establishment in the neighborhood of the recipient. The 
catch is that most poor neighborhoods lack state certified childcare facilities. Mothers have 
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no alternative except to leave children in places where health, security, and staff regulations 
are not met. 
The responsibility of the states in financing TANF has grown, and so has their autonomy 
in implementing the program. But, under law, states cannot run deficits, and when their 
revenues fall in hard times, programs such as TANF are the first to be cut. California’s 
revenue shortfalls in 2001 deprived 200,000 of pre-school offspring of TANF mothers of 
childcare (Figueira-McDonough, 2007b).
A federal provision of TANF in 2006, as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, 
increased the restrictions of the program and pushed more financial responsibility to the 
states. This has already led to further cuts in services (Western Center on Law and Poverty, 
2006).
Processes of Poor Women’s Marginalization 
The marginalization of women and minorities in the welfare system of the United States 
has been brought to light by a group of women (Abramovitz, 1989; Fraser, 1989, Gordon, 
1994, Quadagno, 1989) who have documented their historical treatment as second-class 
citizens. From the start, ADC/AFDC programs were less generous than other public assistance 
measures and discriminated racially and in terms of various moral and cultural traits. Some of 
those barriers fell in the ‘60s and ‘70s, but others surfaced during the ‘80s. Most important, 
AFDC was the only program not to be price-indexed. Hence, real cash benefits nearly 
halved between 1970 and 1994. Since to be eligible women have to have incomes below 
the benefits, this meant that more women below the poverty level were excluded from the 
program  due to the depression in the benefits’ value. By 1993 about 40 % of children in 
poor families were not receiving public assistance (Blank, 1997).  
Biased treatment of women preceded, and was perpetuated by, welfare policies. Class, 
gender, and race intersected in the construction of poor women by the dominant society. 
These women were chronically on the brink of being labeled as undeserving in view of the 
contradictory expectations set for them and their lived experiences. Ideals of the nuclear 
family, the myth of the family wage, and gender expectations about the division of labor 
were at odds with the daily lives of women in poverty. They had to support their families 
with very low wages; their family arrangements reflected survival adaptations, often relying 
on relatives, friends and neighbors (Figueira-McDonough & Sarri, 1987; Reigot and Spina, 
1996: Zinn, 1989).
Reinforcing this quasi-deviant perspective was a moral barrage that attributed all kinds of 
social ills to mother-headed families: increased rates of delinquency, dropping out of school, 
and teen pregnancy. This breakdown of the family ethic has been a popular explanation for 
the feminization of poverty in the United States. Census data showed that poor two-parent 
families were twice as likely to come apart in two years. However, showing a correlation 
between family structure and poverty and proving causation are two different things. Class 
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and race are more important than family structure in determining poverty (Children’s Defense 
Fund, 1987). Female-headed families are often the product of a reshuffling of poverty from 
already poor two-parent-headed families to mother-headed families (Bane, 1986). It is more 
often the case that poverty creates female-headed families than the reverse (Schram, 1995: 
142-161).
In other OCED countries there is a much lower difference between the poverty of single 
heads of household and other women. In Sweden, for example, single mothers are slightly 
better off than other women, and in Canada there is no difference. In France, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom poverty among single mothers is higher by two to six percent. However, 
in the United States the poverty rate is 11 % higher, indicating lower public support of these 
mothers (Luxemburg Income Study, 2000).
Viewed from another perspective, public assistance for female heads of households was, 
in fact, a bargain for the state. It reinforced the obligation of mothers to take care of their 
children in the cheapest possible way. Attributing negative characteristics to the mother 
legitimized this strategy. The controls exercised by the system emphasized an expectation 
that poor women are not to be trusted because they have not lived up to the family ethic. 
This perspective distorts public opinion about welfare recipients (Broodkin, 1983; Klugel 
and Smith, 1986; Gillens, 2000). It also encouraged withdrawal and passivity on the part of 
recipients (Cloward and Piven, 1974; Schneider and Ingram, 1993: Wilson, 1996). Fraser 
(1989) exposes some of the contradictions of AFDC in the transitional period which apply 
as well to TANF:
[T]his system created a double bind for women raising children without a male 
breadwinner. By failing to offer daycare for their children, job training , and a 
job that pays a family wage, it constructs them as exclusively mothers…Yet the 
system does not honor these women [as mothers]. On the contrary, instead of of-
fering them a guaranteed income equivalent to a family wage as matter of right, it 
humiliates, stigmatizes and harasses them. In effect, it decrees that these women 
must be and yet cannot be normative mothers (Fraser, 1989: 142, 153).
Recently, new norms have emerged that further denigrate poor women. One is the concept 
of dependence (Fraser and Gordon, 1994), which refers exclusively to economic dependence 
on the state. Another is the use of the statistical norm of mothers’ work as a justification for 
requiring poor mothers to enter the job market as a way to achieve self-sufficiency. New 
language and policy place additional negative labels on welfare mothers: that they are weak 
and lazy (Mead, 1986), that they stay on welfare living off generous benefits, and that they 
have children in order to increase such benefits. Although such allegations have proven to 
be false (Blank, 1997; Berrick, 1995; Edin and Lein, 1997), they persist and have come to 
justify the draconian regulations of TANF.
Blaming female-headed families for growing poverty provides a convenient way to 
deflect attention from the faulty redistribution policies of the welfare state (Males, 1993). 
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Attributing poverty to single motherhood implies that women’s decisions are the cause of 
their poverty and that they deserve to be treated punitively.  Issues of constrained choices, 
blocked opportunity, and cumulative access to resources are ignored. Public assistance 
becomes less readily available, more temporary, more contingent on moral and social 
regulation, more premised on state surveillance on sexual, medical, social, and parental 
choices, and more attached to work requirements regardless of whether work improves or 
not their economic condition.
The popularity of workfare as a means toward self-sufficiency for mothers on public 
assistance was based on statistics showing that three-fourths of mothers with pre-school 
children were in the labor market in 1990 and that a high proportion of those mothers 
were heads of households. The obvious conclusion was that if other single mothers were 
working, why not mothers on public assistance?  The inference disregarded the higher 
earnings of middle-class women, their greater access to programs in the neighborhoods 
where they reside, and the fact that in general their families and the children’s fathers have 
more resources to help them. Ignoring different circumstances across socioeconomic strata 
is a common gimmick in a society that has always denied the existence of classes (Ambert, 
1998; Stone, 1988).
Some poor women’s advocates support the work requirements for most women in good 
physical and mental health, but they argue that good public child care has to be available 
to these women (Figueira-McDonough, 2007b) and that the work income should meet self-
sufficiency standards (Pearce, 2002). Failing that, given the low-paying jobs these women 
have access to, their income should be complemented by public assistance (Jencks, 1995).
Evaluations of TANF demonstrate that although public assistance rolls have dropped 
significantly, poverty among women and children has not. Nearly 30 % of women who have 
left public assistance have returned because of job instability; another third are having trouble 
meeting basic needs of shelter and food; another 15 % have been unable to pay utilities or 
rent (Weil and Finegold 2002). There is no doubt that some of the women who left TANF 
for work are doing better, but that was true under AFDC as well. The predictions are not 
optimistic. Legislation in 2006 ignored the evaluations of the outcomes of the first decade 
of TANF implementation. It simply created more draconian stipulations that further reduce 
the assistance budget for poor mothers and their children (Figueira-McDonough, 2007a: 
chap 11 and 13).
The American Gulag: Extending the Net of Control
After having held more or less constant for decades, the prison population in the United 
States has quadrupled. Among the industrialized nations the U.S. has the highest rate of 
incarceration. At the end of the 20th century, over five million people were in state custody, 
including prison, jails, probation and INS (immigration and naturalization service) centers. 
This growth has disproportionately impacted minority, racial, and ethnic groups (Davis 
1998).
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Such extensive and biased incarceration fosters, among target groups , disrespect for and 
suspicion of authorities and alienates them from the political process. On any given day 30 
percent of black men, between the ages of twenty and twenty nine, are under correctional 
supervision. The African-American rate of imprisonment is ten times higher than that of 
the white men. A young black man aged 16 in 1996 had a 28 percent chance of spending 
time in prison (Chaiken, 2000).
What is the cause of this epidemic of correctional institutionalization? How can it be 
explained that, in the land of the free, more citizens are in prison than elsewhere? Are 
Americans more crimogenic than other peoples? It has long been known that the rate of 
imprisonment is not correlated to crime rate, suggesting a disjunction between state control 
and the incidence of lawless behavior (Quinney, 1975). 
The “get tough on crime “ philosophy as a means of protecting the safety of law-abiding 
citizens has traditionally focused on removing violent criminals from communities, a 
commonsensical goal in any society. However, at the time of rapid growth in incarceration, 
only 30 % of the inmates had been convicted for violent crimes. The remaining were convicted 
for non-violent offenses, and half of those were first offenders (Tonry, 1995).
Students of deviance recognize that there is a direct connection between the number of 
regulations and the magnitude of deviant behavior. The extraordinary expansion of Americans 
behind bars has led analysts to examine the connections between control policies developed 
in the past two decades and the explosion of the incarcerated population. Three of these 
policies, developed in the period of neo-conservative ascendancy, have been linked to the 
expansion of citizens behind bars: the War on Drugs, ‘three strike’ federal legislation, and 
mandated sentences. The first is considered the most responsible for targeting minorities in 
poor neighborhoods (Provine, 2005). Three strikes legislation automatically condemns three-
time offenders to decades of imprisonment, even if previous offenses were misdemeanors. 
For certain offenses, judges have no discretion but must follow predetermined sentences, 
regardless of circumstances,
President George Walker Bush’s War on Drugs promulgated legislation that 
indiscriminately punished consumption, possession, small trading, large distribution, and 
smuggling with equally long preset sentences. Michael Tonry (1995) and Angela Davis (1998) 
concur that the legislation was designed to commit small traders and users to prison as a 
symbolic show of success aimed at distracting from decades of failure at controlling drug 
production and smuggling (Galbraith, 1992). The intent was not so much to decrease drug 
availability and use but to punish indiscriminately individuals in the most easily supervised 
poor urban areas. This intention was still made clear as crack, a drug popular in inner cities, 
carried a much more severe punishment than cocaine, a more expensive drug favored by 
higher income users (Provine, 2005).
Reinman’s work (2001) indicates that at each level of the justice system, from arrest to 
conviction to sentence, the probability of the poor being imprisoned grows exponentially 
as compared to higher income lawbreakers caught for the same offense. Data collected 
by Butterfield (2000) shows that the system creates a self-perpetuating caste of prisoners. 
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The high probability of released prisoners going back to prison is an important element 
in the unabated growth of incarcerated population. In California, for example, four out of 
five released inmates return to prison, not for committing new offenses but for technical 
violations of the terms of their parole.
Two policy decisions account for this. On one hand, states sharply curtailed education, 
training, and drug treatment programs, credit for earned good time and other rehabilitation 
in prison, thus compounding the barriers to social integration faced by released inmates. On 
the other hand, with the get-tough approach, parole officers had to follow new regulations 
conducive to quick revocation of ex-inmate’s parole. A parole profile of the released prisoners 
in California speaks of the entrapment experienced by this population: 85 % of released 
prisoners are drug and alcohol abusers, over 70 % remain jobless one year after release, 50 
percent are illiterate, and 10 % are homeless (Butterfield, 2000).  Having a prison record is 
a barrier to employment, but even when a job is secured wages are half of that paid to other 
workers in same level and field. Furthermore, felons are often barred from some occupations. 
When Harriet Davis, a nurse, was released from prison after completing her sentence for 
shooting her abusive husband in self-defense, she found out that she could not practice her 
profession and had to work as home-care aid.
To a large extent, the discrimination and human costs of these new policies are dismissed 
under the interpretation of just deserts. Still, one might expect that the economic costs 
of this burgeoning institutionalization would disturb taxpayers. There is yet another side 
to the phenomenon: the prison-industrial complex. There are profits to be made from 
emprisonment. 
The construction of new prisons has been a bonanza for architects, construction 
companies, and the construction business in general. The greater the requirements for 
inmate control (e.g., more isolated cells, computerized locks, and so on), the greater the 
dividends for businesses in such fields. In addition, the substantial increase in demand for 
correctional guards has made this one of the most promising fields for unskilled and semi-
skilled workers.
Probably the most perplexing contribution of the demand for processing the expanding 
population behind bars was the emergence of private, for-profit prisons. By the end of the 
nineties, for-profit prison s had about 80,000 inmates. Two of those companies (Corrections 
Corporation of America and Walknut Corrections Corporations), run 114 facilities and raised 
revenues well over half a billion dollars (Davis, 1998).
Furthermore, the exploitation of prison labor is probably the most extreme case of 
profiteering from an incarcerated population. Although the United States has protested 
vehemently against the unfair practices of China competing in the world market with very 
cheap products produced by prisoners, it has fallen prey to a similar, albeit more limited, 
strategy. For example, Chevron, TWA, and Victoria’s Secret use prison labor to do data-
entry, book telephone reservations, and to make lingerie at 23 cents an hour. In California 
alone, goods and services produced by the prison industry in late ‘90s totaled more than 
150 million dollars (Davis, 1998; Laffer, 1999).
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A nightmarish vision of ultimate exploitation would suggest that putting the unemployed 
and poor in prison could eventually prevent the exodus of unskilled jobs abroad. Prisoners’ 
work is just as cheap, and businesses would save the costs of transporting products. This calls 
to mind Jeremy Bentham’s prediction of a futurist society where devotion to a free market 
creates an oligarchic regime reconstructed as an ideal prison (Gray, 1998).
The Added Oppression of Women Behind Bars  
The new ideology of control and criminal policy has affected women as well as men. 
However, the rate of increase of incarceration among women was much higher partly 
because the absolute number of female prisoners prior to the reforms of the ‘80s was small. 
Nevertheless, by the end of the last century, one in every 109 adult women in the United States 
was under correctional supervision (Greenfield and Snell, 1999). This increase surpasses by 
a large margin demographic growth and the incidence of crime. 
Explanations of the historical gender difference in incarceration rates have considered 
various alternatives. Some have suggested that it was the result of lower criminal rate 
due to natural causes (Lombroso, 1920) or of women’s restricted exposure to access and 
opportunities in the public sphere (Adler, 1975; Pollack. 1950; Simon, 1975; Steffensmeyer, 
1978, 1980), or simply to the greater cultural controls imposed on them (Hagan, Gillis and 
Simpson, 1985: Hill and Atkinson, 1988).  Another popular explanation— the so-called 
chivalry hypothesis—is not that women commit more crimes but that the justice system 
treats them more leniently. 
Research reveals a gendered justice, not necessarily a more lenient one. Police react more 
strongly to “improper” feminine behavior than to the alleged offense (Visher, 1983; Chesney-
Lind, 1978, Steffensmeyer, 1980). In court, women have less access to lawyers and plead 
guilty more often than men (Figueira-McDonough, 1985; La Belle, 2002). Also, convicted 
women receive longer sentences than male offenders for the same offense. Seriousness seems 
to be defined by a gender-separated ranking system according to the offense range within 
each group. Hypothetically, if larceny is a third most serous offence among convicted women, 
its level of seriousness would correspond to the third most serious offence committed by 
men: robbery. The length of sentence followed these gender-segregated rankings (Figueira-
McDonough et al. 1981; Bloom and Chesney-Lind, 2000). Serious offenses, violent and 
person offenses account for about 25 % of the convictions of women incarcerated, while 
the remaining 75 % are for non-serious offenses, of which drug offenses account for more 
than 35 percent.  Nearly half of the serious offenders had no previous criminal records (U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2000). 
The post-1982 withdrawal of rehabilitation programs from prisons in the United States 
was still more extreme in women’s prisons, where they had been always scarce. The new 
approach to corrections resulted in similar problems for both genders, but they were more 
accentuated for women. Two factors made the oppression of women harsher. The first 
originated with Lombroso, who interpreted crime as the dangerous expression of manly 
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behavior but defined female crime as a monstrous aberration of nature. Similar gender 
attributions were made by Pollack (1953) who attributed to women a manipulative type of 
behavior, which manifested itself mainly in the private sphere, consistent with their “natural” 
structural position. More recently, the deviance of criminal women was supposedly rooted in 
deep psychological disturbances (Rock, 1996). All these views assumed an incompatibility 
between criminality and womanhood. They defined female criminals  as freaks of nature. 
To the extent that female prisoners experience the erosion of their identity, they are 
more likely than men to become depressed, feel powerless and unable to resist oppression 
(Human Rights Watch, 1996). To the extent that their controllers perceive them as debased, 
they will be more likely to oppress them without fear of retaliation. This becomes more 
salient because the majority of prison guards are men. The frequency of sexual abuse found 
in women’s correctional institutions in five states by the Women’s Rights Project confirms 
this. Guards who abuse these women felt that they had lost the right to privacy and dignity 
and could be used as they please. The women interviewed felt totally powerless, while the 
silence of wardens proves them right (Human Rights Watch, 1996). This recalls the writings 
of Genet about his experiences in prison, which give keen insight into identity and attribution 
processes linked to gender (Millett, 1970).
The second dimension affecting women in prison is motherhood. Seventy percent of 
women behind bars have children under 18 (Pimlott and Sarri, 2002). The view that these 
women are worthless extends to defining them as unfit mothers. Many states have tried 
to cut parental rights of women prisoners, in spite of the fact that their crimes might be 
unrelated to their mothering capability.  Edin and Lein (1997) have found in their study of 
women in poverty that unlawful behavior is often the outcome of a motherhood ethic. Some 
infractions were committed to ensure the welfare of the children. Nonetheless, the official 
view is that they are by definition bad mothers and that contact with their children should 
be minimized. How those bridges might be reconstructed when the mother is released does 
not concern correctional departments.
The following is a synopsis of the story of one mother who was caught deliver-
ing a small package of cocaine to a distributor on the promise of a modest   pay 
that would ease the circumstances of single mother taking care of four children. 
The account is quite similar to the experiences of other incarcerated mothers 
interviewed by Bortner (2002).       
Elaine Bartlett was sent to prison for a first drug offense and received a sentence of 20 
years to life.  Her children at the time were ten, six, three, and one.  The most heartbreaking 
scenes depict Elaine huddled with her children in prison visiting rooms. The family gathered 
every weekend and posed for pictures taken by the visiting room photographer showing 
the children as they grow up. The common problems of each age were compounded by the 
trauma of separation from their mother. Prisoners’ children spend holidays and birthdays 
behind bars.  Elaine’s mother recounts these problems, and the letters sent to Elaine by her 
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children reveal the pain of her absence. In time, Elaine is pardoned. Her mother, who had 
taken care of her children, has died and her extended family had come apart. Elaine had to 
create a life for herself and her younger children after 14 years behind bars: find a job, a place 
to live and reconnect to her damaged family. Because she was convicted of a drug felony, 
she is barred from applying for public assistance. She realized that she had exchanged the 
prison behind bars for a prison that awaits ex-offenders who try to make it in the real world 
(Gonnerman, 2003).
Epilogue
The goal of the neo-conservative movement, so widely popularized by President Reagan, 
was to revive the fantasy of an earlier era when capitalism ran free and puritanical mores were 
enforced. The welfare policies implemented during the Reagan era and the years following 
(1980-2005) are reminiscent of the Poor House laws of the mid-nineteenth century. The 
purposes are identical: force the poor to work with minimal compensation, and keep them 
invisible (Wagner, 2000).
Poor and imprisoned women are highly sexualized in public discourse. At the same time, 
public policies render them asexual; they are denied sexual identities and relationships. They 
are branded as defective women and unworthy mothers. Their reproductive capacities and 
cultural roles are primary. Their function as (often sole) caregivers makes them extremely 
vulnerable when policies threaten their responsibilities towards their children. The system 
amounts to a gender tax inflicted on poor and imprisoned women as their exclusion from 
mainstream society continues unabated (Bortner, 2002).
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